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Abstract
The discredit of multiculturalism in contemporary 
discussions about cultural diversity and democracy is 
problematic since allegations of multiculturalism’s failure 
and undemocratic consequences are used to justify a 
(re)turn to assimilation throughout Western societies. 
Rejecting assimilationism as either desirable or inevitable, 
this article challenges the alleged incompatibility between 
multiculturalism and democracy. It makes the case for a 
(re)conceptualisation of both multiculturalism and democ-
racy in ways that can provide the foundations for inclusive 
communication. To this end, the article endorses, fi rst, a 
specifi c kind of multiculturalism, namely, critical multicul-
turalism. Critical multiculturalism defi nes culture in struc-
tural and relational terms, underscoring the superfi ciality 
with which multiculturalism has been deployed in Western 
societies. Secondly, the article examines the constraints 
that liberal and republican models of democracy impose 
on a fair politics of cultural diversity. It argues that, largely 
due to its communication emphasis, Habermas’s delibera-
tive democracy is particularly receptive to the demands of 
critical multiculturalism. 
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Introduction
Despite the diversity of ways in which multicultural principles and policies have 
been conceived and deployed, pronouncements over multiculturalism’s retreat 
are heard across Western societies (see Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004; Koppmans 
et al. 2005; Turner 2006; Vervotec and Wessendorf 2010). Most recently, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron made 
headlines around the world as they pronounced the failure of multiculturalism. 
What Germany and the UK need, each head of state argued, is to strengthen their 
national identity and make sure that immigrants adopt the offi  cial language and 
culture. While Merkel and Cameron focused on their countries, the la er – whose 
speech was aimed at addressing the threat of terrorism – explicitly referred to the 
UK case as an example of how Europe in generally “needs to wake up” to defend 
its “open societies” (Cameron 2011).
Cameron’s and Merkel’s disapproval of multiculturalism is neither exceptional 
nor surprising. In fact, their arguments have become commonplace in both political 
and academic debates, among the political le  and right, where multiculturalism is 
seen as encouraging “ethnic” interests, which confl ict with national interests, and 
as overplaying particularities, contributing to the political, social, and economic 
segregation of minority groups (see Bloemraad et al. 2008; Philips and Saharso 
2008; Vervotec and Wessendorf 2010). In short, multiculturalism is seen as a source 
of divisiveness and exclusion. It is accused of harming not only minority groups, 
but also democracy itself.
Taking the accusations against multiculturalism seriously forces us to consider 
alternative ways to conceptualise the role of cultural diversity in democratic societ-
ies. One possibility is to discard multiculturalism altogether. Given that multicultur-
alism developed mainly as a critique to assimilation (Kymlicka 1995; Joppke 1996), 
discarding multiculturalism would imply accepting the “return of assimilation” 
(Brubaker 2001). Indeed, assimilationist models of citizenship are gaining terrain in 
various Western societies previously characterised as multicultural. Even if under 
the less conspicuous label of “integration” (Philips and Saharso 2008), post-multi-
culturalism discourses and policies demand minorities’ adaptation to the dominant 
culture as a condition for social inclusion.
This paper rejects the acceptance of assimilationism as either desirable or inevi-
table. It argues, instead, for the strengthening of a specifi c kind of multiculturalism, 
namely, critical multiculturalism. Part I explains what is specifi c of critical multi-
culturalism, its advantages for social inclusion, and how critical multiculturalism 
responds to the main criticisms raised against multiculturalism in general. Part 
II revisits the alleged incompatibility between multiculturalism and democracy. 
Instead of discarding critical multiculturalism for its misfi t within traditional lib-
eral and republican models of democracy, the paper endorses a third democratic 
model, one based on Habermas’ deliberative democracy. This model of democracy, 
it is argued, is particularly receptive to the demands of inclusive communication 
in culturally diverse societies. 
Critical Multiculturalism
Notwithstanding the ease with which the word has been used in contemporary 
discussions, “multiculturalism” is not a concept that can be taken for granted. Far 
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from being a centralised program for reform, it is rather a series of propositions 
– “some so mild that they would probably be acceptable to those who see them-
selves as the fi ercest critics of multiculturalism” (Glazer 1997, 10). Benhabib (1996, 
17) argues that multiculturalism has been used to refer to such a wide range of 
phenomena that it “has practically lost meaning.” As a result, some progressive 
scholars have given up the term “multiculturalism” altogether to defend a cultural 
politics under a diff erent label, such as Young’s (2000a) “politics of diff erence” and 
Fraser’s (1998) “transformative politics of recognition.” 
This paper, however, joins those who refuse to allow the cooptation of multi-
culturalism’s potential for cultural intervention and who endorse, instead, a critical 
defi nition of multiculturalism. As Palumbo-Liu (2002, 117) explains, the appropria-
tion of multiculturalism by neoliberal interests underscores the need to reclaim it, 
“to constantly struggle to defi ne multiculturalism’s terms and values against such 
takeovers.” In line with this undertaking, anthropologist Terece Turner (1993, 413) 
contends that to narrow the gap between his discipline and multiculturalism, “one 
must specify which multiculturalism an anthropologist might want to contribute to.” 
The response from Turner (1993) – as well as from other scholars in anthropology 
and elsewhere – is “critical multiculturalism” (Chicago Cultural Studies Group 
1992; Estrada and McLaren 1993; Palumbo-Liu 1995). 
What critical multiculturalism criticises are “the ideological apparatuses that 
distribute power and resources unevenly among the diff erent constituencies of 
a multicultural society” (Palumbo-Liu 1995, 2). Accordingly, Lugones and Price 
(1995) call it “structural multiculturalism.” The core of critical multiculturalism 
is a structural conception of culture, based on the deconstruction of two seeming 
dichotomies: a dichotomy between structure and culture and a dichotomy between 
the interests of cultural groups and a “common interest.” For critical multicultur-
alism, it is particularly important to problematise the apparent tension between 
each of these pairs. To assume that structure is disconnected from culture and that 
group interests threaten common interests leads to a problematic understanding 
of culture and cultural diff erences, which, in turn, suggests an inescapable confl ict 
between equality (in both political and economic terms) and cultural diff erence. 
Critical multiculturalism’s structural and non-essentialist approach to culture, in 
contrast, enables a democratic appreciation of cultural diff erence. 
Redistribution versus Recognition? 
While critics from the right worry about the preservation of a national culture 
and accuse minorities of threatening it, critics from the le  recognise the disem-
powered position of minority groups. They criticise multiculturalism for focusing 
too much on cultural or ethnic diff erences while failing to provide socio-economic 
equality. As Paul Scheff er (2000) has said with respect to the Netherlands, “[t]he 
energetic approach to social divisions adopted in the past is matched only by the 
hesitancy now shown in dealing with the multicultural fi asco taking place before 
our eyes.” 
Underlying the le ist critique of multiculturalism is a tension between socio-
economic equality and cultural rights, which Fraser (1998; 2003) calls the “redis-
tribution-recognition dilemma.” Redistribution and recognition, Fraser explains, 
appear to be two confl icting aims of justice. Redistribution defi nes collectivities 
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economically, that is, on the basis of class. Recognition, in turn, is based on a 
socio-cultural defi nition of groups. Maldistribution, then, is rooted in relations of 
production; misrecognition, in “social pa erns of representation, interpretation, 
and communication” (Fraser 2003, 13). While redistribution promotes equality in 
order to repair socioeconomic injustices, recognition promotes diff erentiation in 
order to repair symbolic injustice. The dilemma between the two, in brief, is one 
between equality and diff erence. 
While Fraser’s diagnosis of the apparent contradiction between cultural and 
economic injustice is useful for developing an understanding of critical multicul-
turalism, the way in which she resolves this apparent contradiction is not. Fraser 
acknowledges a politically relevant overlap between economic maldistribution 
and cultural misrecognition, but upholds the distinction between these two kinds 
of injustices. In this way, she “reproduces the division that locates certain oppres-
sions as part of political economy and relegates others to the exclusively cultural 
sphere” (Butler 1997, 270-1). Endorsing the dichotomy between recognition and 
redistribution leads Fraser “to misrepresent feminist, anti-racist and gay liberation 
movements as calling for recognition as an end in itself, when they are be er un-
derstood as conceiving cultural recognition as a means to economic and political 
justice” (Young 1998, 51). In a dichotomous model as the one advanced by Fraser, 
that is, any social group whose politics involves both claims for the recognition of 
diff erence and for economic equality – be it African Americans or Latinas/os in the 
United States; Muslims in Europe; queer and indigenous peoples in large parts of 
the world – seems torn between contradictory goals. 
A more constructive approach to the apparent dilemma between redistribu-
tion and recognition can be found in Butler’s (1997) and Young’s (1990; 2000a) 
proposals for cultural materialism. Both authors criticise Fraser and other le ist 
critics for dismissing the cultural focus of current social movements by relegating 
culture to a secondary sphere with respect to material (i.e., “real”) life. As Butler 
(1997, 268) puts it, 
The charge that new social movements are “merely cultural,” that a unifi ed 
and progressive Marxism must return to a materialism based in an objective 
analysis of class, itself presupposes that the distinction between material and 
cultural life is a stable one. And this recourse to an apparently stable distinc-
tion between material and cultural life marks the resurgence of a theoretical 
anachronism. 
What Butler calls a “theoretical anachronism” is the theoretical insistence on 
the decoupling of culture and structure. To reject this decoupling and articulate 
a cultural materialist approach, critical multiculturalism relies on the theoretical 
legacies of post-structuralism. In particular, it draws on the notion of overdetermi-
nation. As Williams (1977) reminds us, structure determines culture not in that the 
fi rst gets mirrored in the la er, but in that structure sets limits and exerts pressures 
on cultural processes. Moreover, structure itself is always culturally mediated. 
Representation and reality, “language and signifi cation [are] indissoluble elements 
of the material social process itself, involved all the time both in production and 
reproduction” (Williams 1977, 99). 
Following the logic of overdetermination, critical multiculturalism conceptu-
alises “issues of justice involving recognition and identity as having inevitable 
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material economic sources and consequences” (Young 1998, 53). Social unity, that 
is, cannot rely on the bracketing of cultural diff erences and confl ict. As Butler 
(1997, 269) explains, “for a politics of ‘inclusion’ to mean something more than the 
redomestication and resubordination of such diff erences, it will have to develop 
a sense of alliance in the course of a new form of confl ictual encounter.” Such a 
politics of inclusion must be based on “a mode of sustaining confl ict in politically pro-
ductive ways” (Butler 1997, 269, emphasis in the original), a mode that recognises 
diff erences without excluding or subordinating some diff erences to others. 
Young’s and Butler’s cultural materialist approach, in sum, understands culture 
in relation to the material conditions in which it is situated. By recognising that 
cultural injustice is always also economic injustice, this approach dissolves the ap-
parent contradiction between claims of recognition and claims of redistribution. 
It argues that since “needs are conceptualised in political struggle over who gets 
to defi ne whose needs for what purpose” (Young 1998, 59), it is also necessary 
to pay a ention to the conditions under which certain needs are articulated and 
recognised as valid. And since to recognise the needs of culturally silenced groups 
is to make them visible, recognition is never simply symbolic, or “merely cultural,” 
to use Butler’s (1997) words.
Cultural versus Common Interests?
As mentioned earlier, multiculturalism is commonly accused of being divisive. 
With diff erent emphases, this accusation comes from the political right and le . 
Both sides see the interests of minority groups as a social threat. The threat, accord-
ing to right-wing critics, is against a given notion of “the good” (Bloom 1987), “the 
Anglo-Protestant culture” (Huntington 2004), or simply “our values” (Cameron 
2011). By defending minority interests, then, multiculturalism would be endorsing 
“cultural relativism” and undermining the stability of the nation. D’Souza’s (1991) 
in the United States goes as far as blaming multiculturalism for neglecting, and 
thus perpetuating, cultural pathologies. 
While admi edly less conservative, the le ist critique follows a similar logic 
and is thus subject to a similar response from critical multiculturalism. In this case, 
it is not necessarily a specifi c national identity and way of life that needs to be 
protected, but a political community more generally. In its defense of “identitarian 
sects,” the le ist argument goes, multiculturalism opposes “common ideals and 
goals, a sense of a common history, a common set of values, a common language, 
and even a universal mode of rationality” (Butler 1997, 265). Put as a confl ict be-
tween the particular interests of cultural groups and the “general interest” of the 
nation, this is basically another version of the dilemma of equality versus diff erence 
presented by Fraser above and is thus addressed by critical multiculturalism in a 
similar way. Drawing once more on cultural materialism, critical multiculturalism’s 
response replaces cultural essentialism with a relational defi nition of culture and 
cultural diff erence. 
The cultural essentialism that underlies both the right-wing and le -wing 
critique of minority interests conceptualises “social groups as fi xed and bounded 
entities separate from others in basic interests and goals” (Young 2000b, 151). To es-
sentialise culture is to draw clear lines between those who belong and do not belong 
to a group, on the basis of a set of given – “shared” – a ributes; and to conceive 
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the group itself as a homogeneous and rigid organism that has to be preserved. 
Understood relationally, in contrast, cultural groups “emerge from the way people 
interact. The a ributes by which some individuals are classed together in the ‘same’ 
group appear as similar enough to do so only by the emergent comparison with 
others who appear more diff erent in that respect” (Young 2000a, 90). What distin-
guishes members of a particular group is a relative social position, a position within 
social structures of knowledge and power. Individuals who share a social position 
may diff er in interests and opinions, but they are united in what Young calls “social 
perspective.” A social perspective is shaped by individuals’ “experience, history, and 
social knowledge derived from that positioning” (Young 2000a, 136). That diff erent 
social perspectives have partial and particular views of the social world does not 
mean that they are necessarily opposed, or in competition, to one another.
This relational defi nition of cultural diff erence enables us to think of minority 
groups in novel and politically productive ways. To focus on a concrete example, 
an essentialist perspective circumscribes U.S. Latinas/os to people of “brown” skin 
color, with a Spanish-sounding last name, whose country of ancestry is somewhere 
south of the U.S.-Mexican border, and who follow a certain pa ern of practices: they 
probably eat tortillas, enchiladas, and tacos, speak Spanish, and listen to rancheras 
or salsa. More importantly, a Latina/o politics would be seen as an a empt to defend 
and preserve these practices in opposition to alternative cultural practices as well as 
to an overarching U.S. culture. Likewise, essentialism identifi es Muslim communi-
ties in Europe with a limited set of cultural practices and their interests are more or 
less equated with the preservation of such practices. A relational understanding of 
cultural diff erence, in contrast, sees U.S. Latinas/os—like the Moroccan-Dutch or the 
Pakistani-British communities – as occupying a specifi c structural position in society. 
As Young (2000a, 95) explains with respect to U.S. Latinas/os, cultural diff erence 
“o en implies predictable status in law, educational possibility, occupation, access 
to resources, political power, and prestige” (Young 2000a, 95). Thus, the politics of 
minority groups should not be equated to the promotion of a minority language, 
food, religion, and music; their interests cannot be reduced to an aggregation of 
individual preferences, nor to the mere demand for cultural preservation. What is 
in the interest of Latinas/os in the US, of the Moroccan-Dutch in the Netherlands 
or the Pakistani-British in the UK is the advancement of structural changes that 
would allow them to speak the language they speak – whether it is Spanish, Urdu, 
Arabic, Berber, English, Dutch or a combination, – eat the food they want to eat 
and listen to the music they want to hear – either the same recipes and songs their 
grandparents ate and listened to or newer ones marked by innumerable processes 
of cultural syncretism – and, at the same time, be fully enfranchised with respect to 
the law, as well as to educational, occupational, material, and political resources.
As these examples show, when cultural diff erence is defi ned relationally, diff er-
ence and equality are not at odds with each other. Group interests do not necessarily 
confl ict with the interests of the broader community. On the contrary, to the extent 
that a group’s claims are targeted against structural inequalities, they are claims of 
justice and, as such, they may become interests shared by the community at large.
The point here is not to say that all group-based politics fi t into a structural jus-
tice-oriented model, but that – in its critical form – multiculturalism is concerned 
with cultural claims that are actually tied to structure and are fundamentally jus-
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tice-oriented. Young’s (2000a) distinction between politics of diff erence and politics 
of identity is instructive in this respect. While, most group-based claims across the 
lines of gender, race, ethnicity, and class are questions of social justice and should 
thus have a privileged place in the broader political agenda, Young argues, there 
are also groups that, following a rather essentialist logic, aim at the protection of a 
certain cultural wealth and the recognition of their distinctiveness. The fi rst kind 
of claims correspond to a politics of diff erence; the second, to a politics of identity. 
Reducing the fi rst to the la er is a common mistake of those who oppose minority 
rights arguing that these rights would erode society. 
Young’s distinction between a politics of diff erence and a politics of identity 
underscores the specifi city of critical multiculturalism. Indeed, the basic criteria 
to distinguish between a politics of diff erence and a politics of identity is the fi rst’s 
structural, as opposed to a “merely cultural,” approach to social groups and its 
relational, as opposed to essentialist, conception of culture. Independently of 
whether one adopts Young’s terminology or not, the diff erentiation between a 
structural-relational and a merely cultural-essentialist politics of culture has at least 
three important implications for understanding and responding to the alleged 
demise of multiculturalism.
The fi rst advantage of critical multiculturalism’s understanding of cultural dif-
ferences is its potential for political alliances and social unity. To the extent that 
cultural interests are not grounded on fi xed heritages, but on social perspectives 
and that each social perspective does not absorb a person’s full identity, fruitful 
alliances based on common (even if not fully overlapping) social positionings 
become possible. Moreover, in appealing to justice, cultural claims are generalis-
able proposals. While originating in a specifi c social perspective, that is, they may 
become legitimate norms for society as a whole. Their success then is not defi ned by 
the defeat of competing claims, but by the advancement of new social agreements. 
This appreciation for justice-driven agreements is precisely what leads critical 
multiculturalism to oppose imposed norms and models of unity that bracket or 
silence diff erences. Proponents of critical multiculturalism seek solidarity across 
diff erences, convinced that “solidarity does not mean that everyone thinks in the 
same way, it begins when people have the confi dence to disagree over issues of 
fundamental importance precisely because they ‘care’ about constructing common 
ground” (Mercer 1990, 68).
A structural-relational view of cultural diff erence is relevant, secondly, because 
it acknowledges that some multiculturalist enterprises, regardless of their social 
value, may not necessarily fi t in the agenda of critical multiculturalism (conceived 
here as a “politics of diff erence”). This would be the case with a conservative 
cultural politics, such as the politics of identity, described by Young. More impor-
tantly, though, critical multiculturalism rejects neoliberal eff orts to co-opt diversity 
(Melamed 2006), which reduce culture to “ornament,” or to what the Chicago 
Cultural Studies Group (1992, 531) illustratively calls “the Bene on eff ect.” In other 
words, an understanding of multiculturalism in its critical form underscores the 
problem of corporate or ornamental approaches that welcome a variety of “ethnic” 
restaurants “or places of entertainment where the music, art, and literature of dif-
ferent cultures is showcased,” while securing that “the many cultures are inactive 
in informing the personality, character, beliefs, and values of workers/citizens and 
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the structure of the economic and political system” (Lugones and Price 1995, 103, 
105; see also Estrada and McLaren 1993). 
Finally, while accounts about the crisis of multiculturalism commonly assume 
that it went too far, critical multiculturalism suggests that the problem has rather 
been the opposite: It underscores the superfi ciality of multicultural policies in 
Western democracies. German chancellor Angela Merkel’s take on multiculturalism 
provides an example of this. “For a while, we kidded ourselves into believing that 
they wouldn’t stay and would leave. Naturally, the notion that we would become 
‘multiculti,’ that we would live next to one another and be happy about one another, 
failed,” argued Merkel (Karnitschnig 2010). Merkel’s view of multiculturalism – one 
grounded on a “we” that excludes minority groups and on the notion that these 
groups (they) “would leave” – is at odds with the critical defi nition of multicultur-
alism discussed above. Not surprisingly, Merkel concluded that Germany needs 
an assimilationist solution in the form of new policies to secure minority groups’ 
adoption of the German language and culture (Eddy 2010).
Deliberative Democracy
An endorsement of critical multiculturalism is an important, but insuffi  cient step 
in defi ning the conditions for inclusive communication in culturally diverse democ-
racies. In fact, this section shows that critical multiculturalism challenges traditional 
models of democracy and fi nds a be er fi t in Habermas’ deliberative politics. This 
discussion starts by examining liberalism and republicanism, the two alternative 
views of democracy from which Habermas diff erentiates his. Admi edly, liberalism 
and republicanism have served as the brand name for too many and too diverse 
political frameworks. The aim here is not to account for all these “liberal” and “re-
publican” frameworks, but rather to underscore the particularities and advantages 
of Habermas’s deliberative model. With this in mind, the discussion focuses on two 
rather extreme interpretations within each tradition: interest-group pluralism in the 
case of liberalism, and communitarianism in the case of republicanism. 
The Free Individual versus the Dialoging Community
Liberalism, put simply, “is a political theory of limited government, providing 
institutional guarantees for personal liberty (…) its central political thesis – the need 
to defend individuals and groups against the oppressive demands and intrusions 
of authority – is plain” (Rosenblum 1989, 5). In order to go beyond the apparent 
plainness of this defi nition, it is necessary to examine how liberalism conceives its 
core value, freedom, and its main threat, government; as well as the implications 
of this in terms of civic participation. Freedom, in the liberal sense, is usually quali-
fi ed as “negative” because it is individuals’ freedom from external constraints. Pe it 
(1997) calls it freedom as “non-interference.” Habermas (1994, 112) refers to it as 
“private autonomy” and describes it in “the form of a legally protected autonomy 
that every person can use to realise his or her personal life project.” The legitimacy 
of norms, in this model, is based on the rule of law. The underling principle is that 
of a social-contract individuals subscribe to in order to secure equal legal rights 
(Habermas 1996a). 
Liberal government, accordingly, is expected to have minimal interference in 
citizens’ autonomy. It must operate as an impartial arbiter to facilitate the free com-
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petition among private interests and must be kept under close civic surveillance. The 
liberal citizen, as a result, is modeled as “the solitary individual” (Barber 1989, 54) 
who engages politically in the pursuit of self-regarding interests. Because this ap-
proach “interprets democracy as a process of aggregating the preferences of citizens 
in choosing public offi  cials and policies” (Young 2000a, 19), it is also known as “an 
aggregative model” of democracy. And because of the way in which the aggregation 
of multiple and usually confl icting private preferences compete with one another, it 
is said to follow the logic of the marketplace (Habermas 1996b; Young 2000a; Baker 
2002). As Young (2000a, 20) sums up, “On this understanding […] democracy is a 
mechanism for identifying and aggregating the preferences of citizens, in order to 
learn which are held in the greatest number or with the greatest intensity.” 
Republicanism, instead, sees democracy as the community’s process of self-
determination. This process involves all community members within a single 
and overarching public sphere in rational deliberation toward shared political 
purposes. “[T]he paradigm is not the market but dialogue” (Habermas 1996b, 23). 
Thus, although freedom and individual autonomy are also important in this model, 
their meaning is not the same as in liberalism. The kind of freedom privileged in a 
republican democracy is “positive” in the sense that it is a freedom for civic action 
or, as Taylor (1989, 170) puts it, “a citizen liberty, that of the active participant in 
public aff airs.” Those who participate in public aff airs are autonomous citizens 
in the sense that they are persons who move freely from the private to the public 
realm and, free from domination, engage in democratic dialogue. In opposition to 
the “private autonomy” privileged by liberalism, Habermas (1994; 1996a) refers 
to this as “public autonomy.” This kind of autonomy is republicanism’s source of 
political legitimation. Norms, to be precise, are legitimate to the extent that they are 
based on popular sovereignty, a principle “expressed in rights of communication and 
participation that secure the public autonomy of citizens” (Habermas 1998, 258). 
The two diff erent notions of autonomy – private and public – lead to contrast-
ing views of the citizen. While the liberal citizen is solitary and self-interested, the 
republican citizen is social in two fundamental ways: identity itself is constituted 
dialogically (Taylor 1994) and civic engagement is always oriented toward common 
understanding. Sandel (1984) captures this distinction in his characterisation of the 
liberal citizen as the “unencumbered self,” for whom “what ma ers above all, what 
is most essential to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity 
to choose them” (1984, 86). While for the unencumbered self, to be autonomous is 
to be free from all aims and interests, the republican citizen is free to pursue certain 
aims and interests that defi ne the self. In this sense, Sandel (1984, 87) explains, the 
republican community is constitutive rather than simply cooperative: It “engage[s] the 
identity as well as the interests of the participants, and so implicate[s] its members 
in a citizenship more thoroughgoing than the unencumbered self can know.”  
To the extent that liberalism relies on the free fl ow of competing interests, it 
assumes a “realistic” defi nition of democracy and of its outcomes. That is, liberal-
ism lacks normative principles with which to evaluate the justice of the decisions 
that succeed in the marketplace of interests. Justice, in liberalism, is defi ned by a 
procedure that is fair because it is equal to all. Liberal citizens, each of whom is 
free to have a diff erent conception of the good, share a common legal system that 
enables them to negotiate their interests but not a sense of common ethos, nor an 
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orientation toward common understanding. In such a proceduralist model of de-
mocracy, strictly based on private autonomy, there is no space for the question of 
what kind of democracy we want and what kinds of decisions we need to take in 
order to achieve that democracy. 
The republican agenda, in contrast, places these normative questions at its core. 
As stressed by Habermas (1996a, 279), republicanism “understands citizenship 
not primarily in legal but in ethical terms. According to this classical view, in the 
political public sphere, citizens join together in seeking what is best for them as 
members of a particular collectivity at a given point of time.” This collective pursuit 
of a common goal corresponds to the “patriotic identifi cation,” which, from the 
republican perspective is “the essential condition for a free (nondepostic) regime” 
(Taylor 1989, 170). Republicans believe that a viable political project cannot be 
based on the mere aggregation of individual interests (even if following a single 
procedure), but requires either the imposition of certain interests over others or, 
as they propose, a superior or patriotic interest, shared by all. 
Equality and Cultural Differences
For critical multiculturalism, it is particularly important to examine how equality 
fi ts into the liberal and republican models of democracy. Republicanism defends 
a broad understanding of social equality as a condition for freedom. Equality, in 
this sense, enables citizens’ civic participation. It justifi es redistributive programs, 
that is, the public investment of private funds to support schools, housing, health, 
and media systems to guarantee equal access to education, housing, health, and 
communication for those who, without such programs would remain “less equal.” 
Liberalism, in contrast, limits equality to a ma er of compatibility among individu-
als’ rights: everyone has equal rights to the extent that one’s freedom of action is 
legally limited by the freedom of action of the others. Thus, liberalism has a hard 
time justifying – and usually ends up minimising – redistributive politics and other 
equalising measures, which are seen as governmental interference on individual 
autonomy. This does not mean that liberalism dismisses equality altogether, but 
that it tends to relegate it to legality while substantial inequalities persist. In sum, 
the liberal understanding of freedom confl icts with an extended notion of social 
equality, while republicanism sees social equality as essential to the very idea of 
citizenship. 
However, the question of equality gets signifi cantly more complicated, for both 
republicanism and liberalism, when the social diff erences under consideration are 
not overtly undesirable ones – such as diff erentiated access to education, health, 
housing, and communications—but cultural diff erences related to gender and sex, 
age, race, and ethnicity. These diff erences and the associated demands for recogni-
tion are unse ling in new and complex ways.
For one, the principle of equal respect requires that we treat people in a dif-
ferent-blind fashion. The fundamental intuition that humans command this 
respect focuses on what is the same for all. For the other, we have to recognise 
and even foster particularity. The reproach the fi rst makes to the second is 
just that it violates the principle of non-discrimination. The reproach the 
second makes to the fi rst is that it negates identity by forcing people into a 
homogeneous mold that is untrue to them (Taylor 1994, 43).
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Equal treatment, as Taylor explains, clashes with cultural recognition under-
stood here as the freedom to be oneself. Additionally, in the case of republicanism, 
cultural diff erences threaten disinterested civic dialogue because bonds created 
around particular cultural identities allegedly confl ict with the nation’s common 
interest. Cultural specifi city, in brief, runs counter to the republican understand-
ing of universal citizenship. The republican model responds by relegating culture, 
together with all other “self-interests,” to the sphere of the private. However, as 
suggested by Taylor in the passage just quoted, this solution is far from satisfac-
tory for those who see themselves as culturally diff erent. Paradoxically, the la er 
see discrimination and exclusion in policies designed under what Taylor calls “the 
principle of equal respect.” 
By giving priority to individual freedom and defending governmental neutral-
ity with respect to citizens’ diversity of interests, liberalism initially appears to be 
a be er host for cultural diff erences. Indeed, its devotion to the free competition 
of interests supposedly goes as far as encouraging society’s varied array of cultural 
possibilities. A er more careful scrutiny, however, liberalism proves to be unrecep-
tive to cultural diff erences in at least two important ways. First, these diff erences 
have a collective rather than an individual basis. Thus, from the liberal perspec-
tive, they limit individual autonomy. The “unencumbered self” must be free from 
ties to ancestry, social status, gender, or sexual preferences in order to command 
personal interests. Liberal freedom, in other words, is always “suspicious of col-
lective goals” (Taylor 1994, 60) either if they are the goals of the nation, or those 
of an ethnic, racial, or sexual community. The second diffi  culty liberalism has in 
hosting cultural diff erences is that marketplace competition off ers li le possibility 
for eff ective participation. Not only does this competition follow a predetermined 
set of procedures, which participants have to accept uncritically, but these proce-
dures privilege the most powerful or “competitive” interests. Since liberal freedom 
confl icts with policies to guarantee everyone’s access to suffi  cient material and 
cultural conditions for democratic participation, that is, diff erent cultural interests 
do not have equal opportunities to be heard. 
In sum, the liberal and republican models, constrained by their understanding 
of freedom, equality, and citizenship, off er a similarly unsatisfactory answer to 
the question of how do cultural diff erences fi t in democracy. Whatever space they 
seem to open for culture is defi nitely closed for a politics of culture. Culture, to be 
precise, is depoliticised either because it is relegated to the private realm in repub-
licanism; or it is subjected to given structures of power in liberalism. The result, in 
both cases is a political system that may guarantee citizens’ “formal” rights, but 
not their “substantive” rights of civic participation, to borrow a common distinc-
tion used in political theory (see Hall and Held 1990). While formal democratic 
rights are shared universally, substantive rights are the privilege of some. In the 
case of liberalism, of the economically powerful. In the case of republicanism, of 
the culturally dominant. If one keeps in mind the structural defi nition of culture 
developed earlier, however, the problem is basically the same: The universal norm 
of citizenship marginalises the diff erent, forcing them to accommodate. 
Proceduralism and Participation
Habermas’s proposal for deliberative politics overcomes an important part of 
the limitations that liberalism and republicanism present for those concerned with 
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democracy and social justice under conditions of cultural diversity. A comparison 
between deliberative democracy and the other two democratic ideals underscores 
the advantages of the fi rst in dealing with the apparent confl ict between equality 
and cultural diff erence. 
Deliberative democracy shares with liberalism a focus on procedure, and, with 
republicanism, a notion of citizenship rooted in community building through civic 
participation. A proceduralist and participatory democratic model challenges a basic 
assumption built into the other two democratic ideals: the idea that common delib-
eration and a common understanding are necessarily tied to a common ethos. 
Deliberative democracy grounds its proceduralism on discourse ethics. This 
moral philosophy is meant to resolve confl icts of justice at a post-conventional 
level (where traditional forms of legitimation are not available), without resorting 
to violence or coercion. It does this by distinguishing between the realm of the 
good (ethics) and the realm of the right (morality), and confi ning itself to the la er. 
Discourse ethics is not oriented toward a predefi ned ethos, but follows, instead, a 
just or deliberative procedure. In Habermas’s normative model of communication, to 
deliberate is to engage in society’s reason-based dialogue, oriented toward common 
understanding, held among all citizens, and free from strategic action (i.e., from 
the infl uence of power and money). Proceduralism, in this sense, does not make 
deliberative democracy value-free. As Habermas (1996b, 26) explains, in this model 
“the normative content rises from the very structure of communicative actions.”
The same reliance on civic participation that separates deliberative democracy 
from liberalism moves it closer to the republican model. Both the deliberative and 
the republican approaches are anchored on a common notion of the public sphere. 
They both understand “democracy in terms of the institutionalisation of a public use 
of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens” (Habermas, 1996b, 23). The two, 
as well, see in solidarity the fundamental source of social integration. Habermas, 
however, believes that republicanism’s built-in assumption of a common idea of the 
good makes this model inoperable. Republicanism’s “ethical overload,” as he calls 
it (1996b, 21), restricts republican democracy to an agreement on value orientations 
and interests that does not exist under conditions of cultural diversity. 
Instead of the common ethnic-cultural identity assumed by republicanism, de-
liberative democracy expects citizens to share a commitment to political discourse, 
the source of which Habermas (1996a; 1998) calls “constitutional patriotism.” 
Constitutional patriotism resolves the problem of solidarity in deliberative politics 
by operating as a “functional equivalent” of nationalism (Habermas 1998, 117). 
Solidarity, in this case, does not rely on the idea of the nation – as a community of 
common descent – or of a common ethnicity, but on a “shared political culture.” In 
this way, Habermas (1998, 118) separates citizens’ political culture from the “subcul-
tures and their prepolitical identities” and stresses how the viability of the fi rst is 
necessarily tied to the respect for the la er. “A correctly understood theory of rights 
requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the 
life contexts in which his or her identity is formed” (Habermas 1994, 112). 
Private and Public Autonomy
Deliberative politics’ theorisation of the link between diff erentiated life con-
texts and legality is particularly useful for critical multiculturalism. This link is 
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grounded on Habermas’s argument on the “reciprocal relation” between private 
and public autonomy. Since the legitimacy of norms in the liberal and republican 
models derives from either one of these two kinds of autonomy – private autonomy 
guaranteed through the rule of law, in the case of liberalism; public autonomy 
guaranteed in the principle of popular sovereignty, in republicanism – they miss 
the interdependency of both sources of legitimation. They fail to see that “[t]he 
democratic process bears the entire burden of legitimation. It must simultaneously 
secure the private and the public autonomy of legal subjects” (Habermas 1996a, 
450). The rule of law, in other words, does not simply guarantee private autonomy, 
but also enables citizens to participate in political deliberation. At the same time, 
in seeing themselves as “authors of just those rights which they are supposed to 
obey as addressees,” citizens recognise the legitimacy of the rule of law (Habermas 
1998, 258). 
The reciprocal relation between public and private autonomy explains, in 
Habermas’s view, the failure of measures of “welfare paternalism.” Aimed at re-
ducing socio-economic inequalities, these measures are imposed from above on 
the basis of predetermined notions of the law. “In this case, citizenship is reduced 
to a client’s relationships to administration that provides security services, and 
benefi ts paternalistically” (Habermas 1996a, 78). It is worth noting that Habermas 
is not in a position to claim that the services and benefi ts resulting from this kind 
of welfare paternalism are good or bad; what he argues is that for them to be valid 
they would have to be authored by the people who are aff ected by them.
For in the fi nal analysis, private legal subjects cannot enjoy even equal indi-
vidual liberties if they themselves do not jointly exercise their civic autonomy 
in order to specify clearly which interests and standards are justifi ed, and to 
agree on the relevant respects that determine when like cases should be treated 
alike and diff erent cases diff erently (Habermas 1998, 262). 
Habermas’s words make implicit reference to discourse ethics’ principle of 
universality. Innerved into his theory of deliberative democracy, this principle 
underscores how justice is necessarily grounded on an open and inclusive debate 
that includes all citizens and, accordingly, all “life contexts.” A recurrent example 
Habermas uses is the debate about gender equality and policies that have over-
looked the perspective of women. Policies of this kind, in Habermas’s (1996a; 1998) 
account, a ack gender inequality as something that deserves the administrative 
execution of norms that are taken for granted. “[F]eminist critique has targeted 
not only the unredeemed demands, but also the ambivalent consequences of suc-
cessfully implemented welfare programs […] It rightly insists that the appropriate 
interpretation of needs and criteria be a ma er of public debate in the political public 
sphere” (1998, 263). It is through public debate, Habermas insists, that the demands 
of equality can be both defi ned and satisfi ed beyond legal or formal frameworks. 
Inclusive participatory debate, that is, can enable actual equality.
Conclusion: Deliberative Democracy’s Communicative 
Advantages
Overall, what makes deliberative politics particularly appealing as the demo-
cratic platform for critical multiculturalism is its communicative core. While republi-
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canism is similarly grounded on social dialogue, its conception of communication is 
not nearly as sophisticated and productive. The kind of communication that derives 
from Habermas’s theorisation does not presuppose understanding and a common 
interest, but enables it. Likewise, one may argue – although Habermas is not always 
as clear in this respect1 – that this kind of communication does not presuppose 
fi xed norms of political participation, but understands all norms as imperfect and 
provisional, always subject to public deliberation. Since discourse ethics occurs at 
a post-conventional stage, it clashes against conformity and dogmatism. “The very 
perspectives that make consensus possible are now at issue” (Habermas 1990, 162). 
This means that all norms need to be morally justifi ed through discourse. “The 
strong discourse-ethical notion of autonomy requires subjects to question even 
pregiven legitimating frameworks and authorities. Validity can then be redeemed 
only on the basis of the formal properties of argumentation” (Rehg 1994, 35). 
Deliberative politics’ communicative focus has at least two signifi cant advan-
tages for critical multiculturalism. First, understanding communication as the 
key instrument of political participation off ers a promising platform for demand-
ing cultural minorities’ participatory representation. Because Habermas’s notion 
of communication requires everyone’s inclusion in a participatory process, it 
underscores the democratic signifi cance of including all voices – not simply the 
ears of communication recipients. The requirement of inclusion of marginalised 
social groups, in other words, cannot be satisfi ed by paternalistic policies designed 
externally and through a naturalised logic that overlooks the life experiences and 
associated perspectives of those groups’ members. Autonomy, it should be kept 
in mind, has to be understood as both freedom and eff ective access to communi-
cative participation. Moreover, this double vision of autonomy also provides a 
useful response to the charges of social fragmentation raised by multiculturalism’s 
opponents. Habermas’s proposal for deliberative democracy cannot presuppose 
a common civic goal but off ers a way to reach it. Predetermined commonality, 
it contends, not only neglects cultural diff erences but imposes some (culturally 
invisible) diff erences over others, intensifying structural inequality. Commonality 
reached in discourse, instead, must acknowledge and include cultural diff erences 
not as a way of distancing them further but of securing an equalitarian dialogue 
that could bring them closer.
Secondly, communication and the consequences of communication in the delib-
erative model cannot be separated from the structural conditions in which discourse 
occurs. Communication operates at all levels of social justice and arguing that a com-
municative approach is apolitical is misunderstanding this. According to Gouldner’s 
(1976) early account of the reception of Habermas’s writings, this is precisely what 
happened with the le ist critique of his work. The problem, Gouldner (1976, 147) 
argues, is that “language is not easily accessible as a lever of political intervention for 
emancipatory change.” Language, Habermas’s early critics assumed, is separated 
from structure, and thus focusing on the fi rst distracts a ention from the real issues 
of social inequality. Interestingly, this is the same assumption of those who criticise 
multicultural politics as “merely cultural,” going back to Butler’s (1997) expression. 
Like Habermas, Butler is convinced of the importance of language in actual (i.e., 
material) social change. Critical multiculturalism can thus fi nd in deliberative politics 
“a mode of sustaining confl ict in politically productive ways” (Butler 1997, 296). 
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Note:
1. Habermas’s (1996a, 1998) notion of constitutional patriotism, for example, may not fi t well with 
the principles of critical multiculturalism, due to its reliance on a clear-cut separation between 
“cultural assimilation” and “political assimilation.”
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